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Abstract 
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administration and workers in other industries. Based on data for the US states, we estimate 
the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen bureaucratic accountability affect 
differences in well-being. We find that well-being differences are smaller in states with high 
transparency, elected auditors, and legal deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are 
consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. No or weak effects 
are found for performance audits and regulatory review.  
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1. Introduction 
We study how effectively government institutions in US states restrict public administrators 
in the pursuit of private interests and the acquisition of rents. Specifically, we address how 
alternative fiscal transparency regimes, selection rules and mandates of state auditors, 
balanced-budget laws, and restraints to administrative rule-making affect the rents of public 
servants. As a direct measure for rents, we exploit differences in the reported subjective well-
being of employees in the public administration and employees in other industries. This 
measure has been introduced and applied in a cross-country framework by Luechinger et al. 
(2008). Using data from the National Survey of Families and Households, we estimate 
interaction effects between institutional restrictions and the status of being employed in the 
public administration. The interaction effects capture well-being differences that 
systematically correlate with governance institutions. In our main analysis for the years 1992-
4, we find that in US states with high transparency regimes, elected auditors, and balanced-
budget laws the difference in subjective well-being between employees in the public 
administration and employees in other industries is substantially smaller. The findings are 
consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. We find no 
correlation of the subjective well-being differentials with performance audits and sometimes 
weak negative correlations with regulatory review by the legislature and independent 
commissions. The results are robust to various changes in the specification and sample. 
However, one caveat should be mentioned upfront: We cannot replicate our results in a 
smaller sample and a smaller set of states for the years 1987-8. 
Section 2 presents the theoretical considerations on the role of specific democratic institutions 
for bureaucratic rents. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy and Section 4 describes the 
data. The results of our main empirical analysis as well as the robustness checks and the 
extensions are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Institutions and Bureaucratic Rents 
The sovereign authority of the public bureaucracy in providing public services offers 
employees in the public administration the opportunity to generate rents. In contrast to a 
model of a benevolent bureaucracy, a political economy view predicts that public 
administrators will acquire those rents and protect them against dissipation. Moreover, the 
pursuit of rents does not simply lead to transfers. As the extraction of rents often involves 
investments of valuable resources, there are fewer resources available for productive 
economic activity, entailing pareto-inferior outcomes. Opportunities for bureaucratic rent-
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seeking are manifold and tied to the several tiers of principal-agent relationships between 
individual employees, managers, elected officials, and voters. First, the multiplicities of 
principals, tasks, and tiers of management and front-line workers characterizing government 
bureaus hamper the use of explicit incentives for aligning the interests of individual public 
servants and their superiors (Dixit 2002). Moreover, output is difficult to measure because of 
its non-market nature. These aspects of the organizational structure in the government sector 
enable subordinates to renege on public work effort in order to pursue personal goals, giving 
them higher utility than when strictly pursuing agency goals. Second, informational 
asymmetries give administrators considerable discretion vis-à-vis the legislature, which 
allows them to pursue their own goals via budget and slack maximization (Niskanen 1971). 
Finally, public agencies are responsible for rulemaking and policy implementation, making 
them attractive targets for rent-seeking activities and enabling them to sell property rights 
created by legislation. 
To organize ideas and to motivate our empirical approach, we set up a very simple framework 
which captures the basic features of our empirical strategy. Bureaucrats can use their budget 
(public funds) ܤ to provide public goods ܩ and to finance rents ܴ = ܤ െ ܩ. Rent seeking is 
discovered with probability ߨ א [0,1), in which case bureaucrats get no rent but need to pay a 
penalty ܲ. The probability ߨ is increasing with better observability of the agent due to e.g., 
WLJKWHU WUDQVSDUHQF\DQGVXSHUYLVLRQVWDQGDUGV+HQFHʌPLJKWEH VHHQ DVDSUR[\ IRU VXFK
institutions. The citizens’ payoff is ݑ(ܩ) and the bureaucrats’ payoff is ݓ൫ܩ,  ܴ൯ = ߙݑ(ܩ) +(1 െ ߙ)(1 െ ߨ)ݒ(ܴ) െ ߨܲ, where ݑᇱ(ܩ) > 0,  ݑᇱᇱ(ܩ) < 0, ݒᇱ(ܴ) > 0,  ݒᇱᇱ(ܴ) < 0.  
The bureaucrats’ maximization problem is: maxீ ݓ(ܩ, 1 െ ܩ). The first-order condition is 
ߙݑᇱ(ܩ) െ (1 െ ߙ)(1 െ ߨ)ݒᇱ(ܴ) = 0 ֞ݑᇱ(ܩ) = ଵିఈఈ (1 െ ߨ)ݒԢ(ܴ). Assuming an interior 
solution, it follows from this first-order condition and the concavity of ݑ(ܩ) and ݒ(ܴ) that the 
optimal public goods provision ܩכ is unique and increasing in ߙ and ߨ. The optimal rent 
ܴכ = ܤ െ ܩכ must thus be decreasing in ߙ and ߨ. Hence, better institutions lead to higher 
public goods provision and less rent seeking. 
The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on subjective well-being differentials which proxy 
for the utility differential ο(ܩ,ܴ) ؠ ݓ(ܩ,ܴ) െ ݑ(ܩ) = (1 െ ߙ)[(1 െ ߨ)ݒ(ܴ) െ ݑ(ܩ)] െ ߨܲ. 
It follows from the above results that ο(ܩכ) must be decreasing in ߨ. Hence, this simple static 
framework predicts that better institutions lead to a lower utility differential between public 
administrators and citizens. 
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We identify four major institutions that are expected to affect the probability of detection ߨ 
and might thus help aligning the incentives of employees in the public administration with 
citizens’ preferences. The institutions aim at reducing information asymmetries or at 
strengthening politicians’ incentives and ability to control the public administration.  
2.1 Fiscal transparency 
Information asymmetries in the democratic decision-making process are a major obstacle to 
holding public servants accountable. Proposed remedies are stricter transparency requirements 
mandating information disclosure as well as the subsequent review of such disclosed 
information by public auditors (see below for the latter aspect). Increased transparency 
involves the disclosure and access to reliable, comprehensive, and timely information and 
allows the legislature and other stakeholders to better observe the workings of government. In 
general, the beneficial effects of transparency requirements stem from the improved 
predictability and credibility of political processes. However, there are also counterarguments 
asserting that transparency inhibits politicians and public servants from taking productive 
risks and breaking promises in the interest of political expediency as more decisions become 
politicized (for a discussion, see Alt et al. 2006). Previous empirical evidence supports the 
favourable effects of increased transparency. Stricter transparency requirements are associated 
with lower levels of debt accumulation (Alt and Lassen 2006a) and smaller political deficit 
cycles (Alt and Lassen 2006b). 
Hypothesis 1: Higher fiscal transparency increases the probability of detection of rent-seeking 
behaviour which reduces the discretion of public administrators in the allocation of funds and 
thus rents in their industry. 
2.2 Public auditors 
Transparency requirements are ineffective if the disclosed information is not accurate or 
timely. It is therefore important that they are backed by independent review. The review of 
financial information is usually conducted by independent public auditing institutions. These 
are mandated to verify and certify the financial statements that are prepared by the 
bureaucracy and issued by the government. If the audits are of poor quality or the auditor is 
not independent from the government, financial statements lose credibility (e.g., Schelker 
2008).  
Auditors typically conduct financial audits, in which they scrutinize financial statements. 
Recent randomized field experiments show that independent financial audits reduce 
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corruption (Olken 2007) and influence electoral decisions (Ferraz and Finan 2008). However, 
some auditing institutions also conduct various forms of performance audits to ensure 
efficient policy implementation. With this extended mandate, audits cover a wider range of 
government activities. In a study analysing US state auditors, Schelker (2012) finds evidence 
that performance audits improve government general obligation bond ratings.1  
Hypothesis 2a: Auditors with a supplementary mandate to conduct performance audits review 
a wider range of government activities. Such mandates improve the quality of information 
available to the principal and, thus, reduce information asymmetries and bureaucratic rents. 
The effectiveness of audits also depends on the auditors’ incentives to reveal inconsistencies. 
In Tirole’s (1986) three-tier principal-agent model in which a principal hires a supervisor to 
control the agent, the main danger arises where the supervisor and the agent collude. In 
theory, the principal will aim at implementing collusion-proof contracts. A first step towards 
reducing the risk of collusion is to keep the auditor institutionally independent from 
government agents, most notably from the executive and the bureaucracy, eliminating direct 
channels for side-payments and reciprocal behaviour. Auditor independence is thus influenced 
by the appointing and dismissal procedures (e.g., Maskin and Tirole 2004; Schelker 2008). 
Hypothesis 2b: Elected auditors have strong electoral ties to the principal - the citizens - and 
are less likely than appointed auditors to collude with the agents - the public administrators. 
Their independence allows effective reviewing of publicly disclosed information, thereby 
reducing information asymmetries and bureaucratic rents. 
2.3 Balanced-budget rules 
Fiscal rules aim at restricting the government in the budget process and are a general response 
to many agency problems identified in political economics. Many countries, and virtually all 
US states, apply fiscal rules that restrict expenditure behaviour and the issuing of sovereign 
debt. The various balanced-budget rules applied in this context differ widely: They allow 
borrowing over one or more fiscal years, apply to the entire budget period or only a part of it, 
and are combined with more or less formal provisions that enforce them (e.g., Poterba 1994). 
Previous evidence indicates that fiscal rules systematically affect fiscal outcomes. Stringent 
balanced-budget laws contribute, for example, to lower public deficits and to faster reactions 
to income shocks, thus smoothing budget surpluses and deficits (Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 
                                                 
1 Extending the audit mandate even further to include also ex ante audits of the budget draft and individual 
policy proposals leads to significantly lower taxes and expenditures (Schelker and Eichenberger 2010). 
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1994). More stringent balanced-budget rules restrict a government’s ability to carry deficits to 
subsequent budget periods and, hence, its scope to allocate funds over time.  
Hypothesis 3: Stringent balanced-budget rules harden the budget constraint and raise a 
government’s incentive to monitor the bureaucracy’s use of public funds, thus reducing the 
potential abuse of funds. 
2.4 Restraints to government rule making 
Government agencies have the competence to set rules and regulations in many important 
policy areas, from environmental protection and public health to banking regulation and 
transportation. While the discretion that administrative agencies have provides them with the 
flexibility to respond to new challenges, it also allows them to pursue private interests, and to 
give in to offers from regulated industries. In order to hold agencies responsive and 
accountable, many jurisdictions introduce specific procedures for reviewing new regulations.  
The US states record the rule-making procedures in their State Administrative Procedure Act. 
Government agencies are bound by various degrees of restraint in their rule-making 
authorities (Grady and Simon 2002). We concentrate on the political actors that constrain 
agencies, i.e., the governor’s office or its designee, the office of attorney general, the 
legislature, including both the committee system and the full body, and an independent rules 
review entity. We are not aware of any systematic empirical work on the consequences of a 
more or less strict regulatory review process. 
Hypothesis 4: The stricter the control of administrative rule-making is by any of the several 
involved political actors, the lower are rents in the public administration. 
Hypothesis 4 does not take into account the tendency for opposing interests to exist between 
the executive branch and the legislator in a presidential system. Opposing interests induce 
legislators to adopt proactive measures in order to protect their interests within the 
bureaucracy. Legislators impose detailed rules of procedure (including regulatory reviews), 
which cannot be easily altered by the executive. This, however, has the overall effect of 
obstructing a bureaucracy’s political control mechanisms and undermines the positive effect 
of regulatory reviews stated in Hypothesis 4. 
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2.5 Other potential determinants of rents 
There are several other potential determinants of well-being differences between industries. 
We concentrate on socio-economic factors, political preferences, and factors related to the 
political process. 
The socio-economic determinants refer to state income, population size, and unemployment. 
The per capita income level in a state is a proxy variable for many factors affecting political 
governance such as an educated citizenry or social capital, but also the level of available 
resources that can potentially be transferred between sectors. A state’s population measures 
the number of people who have to be administered and, thus, reflects the magnitude of the 
organizational problem from which public administrators might benefit. Due to the higher job 
security of employees in the public administration relative to other industries any difference in 
subjective well-being is expected to depend on the state of the economy (Luechinger et al. 
2010). 
Subjective well-being in the public administration might also depend on the population’s 
attitudes towards the state’s active role in various areas of life. It is conceivable that people’s 
political attitudes are, in fact, responsible for the degree of restraint imposed on a 
bureaucracy. In advance of the empirical analysis, note that, when we take a state’s political 
orientation into account (as measured in terms of the political position of the elected state 
representatives), we implicitly control for the correlated institutional factors that we have 
omitted as separate variables. A further extension of our analysis focuses specifically on 
citizens’ trust in state governments.  
Finally, current political factors such as electoral competition and binding term limits might 
affect elected officials (short term) incentives to control the public administration. Moreover, 
if unions are an effective way to organize the interests of public administrators, they may 
assist in the generation and protection of rents. Unions seem to be effective in shielding its 
members from wage adjustments, general cut-backs in public employment, or from 
employment reductions due to privatization of state services (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1997; Blanchflower and Bryson 2004). These latter aspects are subject of a supplementary 
extension of our main analysis. 
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3. Empirical Strategy 
We approximate rents by the difference in reported subjective well-being between workers 
employed by the public administration and workers in other industries.2 This approach has 
been introduced in Luechinger et al. (2008). 
Focusing on subjective well-being allows us to capture the total net benefits of a position in 
the public administration and to account for benefits beyond the respective job such as better 
access to public services or generous pension benefits. This distinguishes our approach from 
previous research on job satisfaction of public and private sector employees (e.g., Heywood et 
al. 2002).  
To assess how the difference in subjective well-being between workers in the public 
administration and other industries (as a proxy for ο(ܩ,ܴ)) are related to the institutional 
factors, we estimate variants of the following empirical model: 
 ܹܵܤ௜௝ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ή 1(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܽ݀݉݅݊)௜௝ + ߚଶ ή 1(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܽ݀݉݅݊)௜௝ ή ൫ࡵ࡯࢐ െ ࡵ࡯തതത൯ 
 +ߚଷ ή ൫ࡵ࡯࢐ െ ࡵ࡯തതത൯ + ߚସ ή ൫ࢆ࢏࢐ െ ࢆഥ൯ + ߚହ ή 1(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܽ݀݉݅݊)௜௝ ή ൫ࢄ࢐ െ ࢄഥ൯ (1) 
 +ߚ଺ ή ൫ࢄ࢐ െ ࢄഥ൯ + ߝ௜௝ , 
where ܹܵܤ௜௝ is the subjective well-being of individual i living in state j, 1(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܽ݀݉݅݊)௜௝ 
is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the respondent is employed in the public 
administration and 0 otherwise, ࡵ࡯࢐ is the institutional variable of interest, and ࢆ࢏࢐ and ࢄ࢐ are 
vectors of individual and state level controls, respectively. 
The individual level control variables ࢆ࢏࢐ capture personal characteristics such as sex, age, 
education, marital status, ethnicity and religious orientation. Income is not included as control 
variable, because it may be an important channel through which rents are appropriated.3 If 
these job characteristics were held constant, the pervasiveness of any rent in the public 
administration would be underestimated. The state-level control variables ࢄ࢐ capture the 
income level in the state, its population, the rate of unemployment and a proxy for political 
orientation (i.e., ADA score). All institutional and control variables are expressed as 
deviations from their mean: ࡵ࡯࢐ െ ࡵ࡯തതത, ࢆ࢏࢐ െ ࢆഥ, and ࢄ࢐ െ ࢄഥ. The coefficient of the constant 
term, ߚ଴, can thus be interpreted as the subjective well-being of the average individual living 
                                                 
2 Recent economic analyses based on data on subjective well-being include, e.g., Deaton (2012) and are 
reviewed, e.g., in Stutzer and Frey (2010). For studies on the effect of institutional and political factors on 
subjective well-being see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2005) and Dreher et al. (2010). 
3 As we discuss in Section 5, the results are robust to the inclusion of log income. 
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in a state with average characteristics, if he or she were to work in the private sector. The 
coefficient ߚଵ measures the average difference in subjective well-being between a person 
employed in the public administration and a person employed in any other industry. 
The main coefficient of interest is ߚଶ. It indicates how much smaller or larger the differential 
in subjective well-being for employees in the public administration is, if some specific 
institutional conditions are in place or are more pronounced. The pure level effect of 
institutional conditions is reflected in coefficient ߚଷ. 
The effects captured by ߚଵ, ߚଶ, and ߚଷ are subject to different identification challenges. The 
average difference in subjective well-being between public administrators and employees in 
other industries ߚଵ is biased to the extent that people self-select into the public administration 
based on unobserved characteristics that are correlated with their reported subjective well-
being (Luechinger et al. 2006). The institutional level effect captured with ߚଷ is biased to the 
extent that other state characteristics (which affect subjective well-being, but are not included 
in the estimation equation) are correlated with the specific institutional factors. Therefore we 
concentrate on ߚଶ. The interaction term identifying ߚଶ can be interpreted as an application of 
a differences-in-differences estimator. Independently of any general difference in subjective 
well-being between industries and any general correlation between institutional conditions 
and subjective well-being, the interaction term identifies any systematic variation in the well-
being differences across states that is correlated with institutional conditions. Since we cannot 
rigorously identify the level effects of institutions on subjective well-being, we cannot rule 
out that institutional constraints make bureaucrats unhappy without making anyone else 
happier. 
To assess the robustness of our estimates, we control for unobserved state specific 
heterogeneity by including state effects, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results by excluding 
individual states from the estimation, we include additional covariates to assess potential 
concerns related to omitted variable bias, and we extend our analysis to address further 
political factors which might affect the relevant utility differentials. Throughout, we use a 
robust estimator of variance that allows for clustering at the state level. 
4. Data 
The data including information on people’s subjective well-being as well as individuals’ 
industry and a range of individual level control variables come from the National Survey of 
Families and Households (NSFH) (Sweet et al. 1988; Sweet and Bumpass 1996). The NSFH 
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is a survey of a nationally representative sample with three waves of data collection (1987-8, 
1992-4, and 2001-8). Our main analysis is based on the second wave, which has complete 
data for the largest cross-section sample of all the three waves; the second wave interviews 
first-wave main respondents and their current and their first-wave spouses (if the latter two 
are not the same). We use data from the first wave to assess the robustness of our findings of 
the institutional variables that are available for the late 1980s; we cannot use third wave data 
because the third wave does not contain geographical information. 
In the second wave of the NSFH, over 16,000 individuals were interviewed. After restricting 
the sample to respondents who report their subjective well-being and the industrial sector of 
their current employment and to individuals with non-missing values for the control variables, 
as well as after having excluded respondents from the District of Columbia, our sample 
contains data for 7,444 individuals. Individuals from all US states, except North Dakota (due 
to missing data), are included in the sample. 
The NSFH elicits subjective well-being with the following question: ‘Next are some questions 
about how you see yourself and your life. First, taking things all together, how would you say 
things are these days?’ Individuals are asked to state their well-being on a scale from 1 (very 
unhappy) to 7 (very happy). The dummy for employment in the public administration is 
created on the basis of the respondent’s industry; it encompasses elected offices and positions 
in the public administration.4  
Individual level controls are sex, age, race, marital status, religion, and the log of years of 
education. Based on the theoretical ideas outlined in Section 2, we add state-level variables on 
transparency, auditors, balanced-budget provisions, regulatory review, and a series of control 
factors. 
Fiscal transparency: An index proposed by Alt et al. (2006) is used to measure transparency. 
The index includes nine dimensions: (i) Is the budget reported according to GAAP standards? 
(ii) Are multi-year expenditure forecasts prepared? (iii) What is the frequency of the budget 
cycle? (iv) Are the revenue forecasts binding? (v) Does the legislative branch have (or share) 
responsibility for the revenue forecasts? (vi) Are all appropriations included in a single bill? 
(vii) Does a nonpartisan staff write appropriation bills? (viii) Is the legislature prohibited from 
                                                 
4 The public administration variable encompasses the following industry codes: executive and legislative offices 
(900), general government, n.e.c. (901), justice, public order, and safety (910), public finance, taxation, and 
monetary policy (921), administration of human resources programs (922), administration of environmental 
quality and housing programs (930), administration of economic programs (931), national security, and 
international affairs (932). 
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passing open-ended appropriations? (ix) Does the budget require published performance 
measures? The overall index (available on an annual basis) is a state’s average score over all 
available sub-measures.5 In 1993, the index is lowest for Indiana (with a value of 0.11) and 
highest for Utah (with a value of 0.89). 
State auditing institutions: We use two measures to capture a state auditor’s mandate and 
independence as proposed by Schelker (2008, 2012). Auditor independence is captured with 
an indicator variable taking value 1 if the chief auditor is elected by the citizens and the value 
0 if he or she is appointed by either the legislature or the executive. In 1993, seventeen US 
states featured elected chief auditors. The variable performance audits is an index capturing 
whether the mandate includes economy and efficiency audits, program audits, and compliance 
audits, which all target the use of public funds. Whenever a form of audit is part of the 
mandate, the index is increased by one unit, thus ranging from 0 to 3. The average score 
across the US states is 1.62 for 1993.  
Balanced-budget provisions: Our main measure captures the strictest form of balanced-budget 
requirement, which is a restriction to carryover deficits to the next budgetary period. The 
indicator stems from Alt and Lowry (1994) and takes a value of 1 if the government is not 
allowed to carryover a deficit to the next period, and 0 if otherwise. Twenty-four states 
featured the strictest form of balanced-budget rule in the United States in 1993. Weaker forms 
of balanced-budget laws require that the governor submits a balanced-budget, where failing 
this requirement, the legislature must enact a balanced-budget, while actual deficits can be 
carried over to the next period simply by borrowing. In a robustness test we also use an index 
variable capturing the stringency of the balanced-budget rule (ACIR 1987). The index ranges 
from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating stricter balanced-budget requirements. Note that in 
many cases balanced-budget rules have been installed already in the original state 
constitutions and did not significantly change over time. Bohn and Inman (1996) examined all 
state statutes on budget rules back to 1970 and did not report any significant changes up to 
1994. Balanced-budget rules thus do not reflect reactions to recent negative fiscal shocks. 
Regulatory review: The control of administrative rule-making is defined in the state 
administrative procedure acts. Four indices measure the restraints embodied in these acts both 
de jure and de facto on state government agencies in the mid-1990s. The indices have been 
constructed by Grady and Simon (2002), based on information provided by the actors 
                                                 
5 The following states lack information on one or two dimensions: GA, KS, KY, LA, MN, and MT (one 
dimension missing) and MA and VT (two dimensions missing). For more details, see Alt et al. (2006). 
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involved in regulatory review and oversight. The four indices are related to the four actors 
with potential formal power over agencies’ rule-making discretion. These are the governor’s 
office or its designee, the office of the attorney general, the legislature (including both the 
committee system and the full body), and an independent rules review entity. The indices can 
take values between 0 and 8. Regulatory review is least pronounced in Mississippi, which is 
indicated by an average index value of 0.50; regulatory review in Maryland is most 
pronounced, indicated by an average index value of 4.75. 
Control variables: In all regressions we include a state’s real per capita income, the state 
population in logs, ADA scores, and the state unemployment rate in levels and interacted with 
the dummy for public sector employment as additional control variables. ADA scores proxy 
political preferences within the electorate of a state (Anderson and Habel 2009). The measure 
relies on the average of the state representatives’ ideological position on a conservative-liberal 
scale ranging from 0 to 100. The most conservative state in 1993 is Wyoming with a score of 
6.42. The most liberal state is Hawaii with a score of 87.57. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the dependent variable as well as the industry and 
state level variables included in our analysis for the sample in our baseline regressions. A full 
list with all the individual level control variables is reported in the online appendix. 
<Table 1 about here> 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 2 reports the baseline regressions using information from the second wave of the NSFH 
from 1992-4. Odd numbered columns present models of the form of eq. (1) with state-level 
controls, even numbered columns further include state effects in order to control for 
unobserved time-invariant state-specific heterogeneity. To assess the influence of institutional 
restrictions on bureaucratic rents, we focus on the relevant interaction effects. Columns I to 
VIII include individual sets of institutional restrictions. An increase in accountability through 
strict fiscal transparency rules, the election of state auditors, and stringent balanced-budget 
rules is statistically significantly associated with a smaller well-being differential for the 
public administration. A one standard deviation increase of transparency lowers the reported 
subjective well-being of public administrators relative to other workers by 0.145 points. If the 
chief auditor is elected rather than appointed, the difference is reduced by 0.276 points. A no-
carryover rule is related to a 0.443 points lower difference. As a robustness test, we also use 
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an alternative measure of budget rules, i.e. the ACIR balanced-budget rules stringency index.6 
Consistent with our main result, the estimated effect is negative, though only weakly 
statistically significant (coef.: -0.037, std. err.: 0.021). A one standard deviation increase of 
the index reduces the well-being differential by 0.093 points. Overall, our results are 
consistent with the Hypotheses 1 (transparency), 2b (elected auditors), and 3 (balanced-budget 
rules). They do not support hypotheses 2a (performance audits) and 4 (regulatory review). 
Performance audits are not significantly correlated with the differences in subjective well-
being. The same holds for the variables capturing the limited discretionary rule-making power 
of civil servants.  
So far the individual sets of institutional restrictions were analysed under an implicit ceteris 
paribus assumption (or that all other institutional factors are orthogonal to the ones under 
study). However, institutions of fiscal transparency and budget rules might well be correlated 
and thus capture related aspects of fiscal accountability. In particular, the index of 
transparency in the fiscal process is a composite measure capturing important aspects of all 
stages of the budget process. The broadness of the measure allows a comprehensive 
evaluation of fiscal transparency, but at the same time it makes it more likely that some 
aspects are partly captured by other variables as well.  
To find the institutional factors that have an independent influence on the well-being 
differentials, columns IX and X include all institutional variables simultaneously. The effects 
of elected state auditors and strict balanced-budget laws are again negative and statistically 
significant. Moreover, the effects are comparable in size to the previous estimates. In contrast, 
the effect of fiscal transparency collapses indicating a correlation between institutions that 
foster fiscal accountability. In the case of rule-making restraints, the estimated coefficients 
remain comparable in size to the previous (insignificant) estimates. However, the estimated 
effects of rule-making restraints imposed by the legislature as well as independent 
commissions become (marginally) significant. A one standard deviation increase of the 
variables capturing rule-making restraints reduces the reported subjective well-being 
differential by 0.092 in case of the legislature and by 0.100 in case of independent 
commissions.  
<Table 2 about here> 
                                                 
6 We give priority to the no-carryover rule because previous research has shown that this most stringent budget 
rule has the most important influence on fiscal outcomes (Poterba 1994; Bohn and Inman 1996). A detailed 
regression output is reported in Table A.3. of the online appendix. 
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An interpretation of the basic difference between public administrators and workers in other 
industries is difficult as we cannot control for self-selection into the different industries. We 
are also reluctant to interpret the cross-section correlations between institutions and the level 
of subjective well-being as they might well be biased due to unobserved correlated factors. 
Institutional factors might be systematically related to political preferences of the electorate, 
to economic performance or to the size of the state. Therefore, we include state ADA scores, 
the unemployment rate, state income, and population as well as the corresponding interactions 
with employment in the public administration in the estimations. In states where more liberal 
politicians are elected to congress, a smaller difference is observed. If ADA scores increase 
by one standard deviation, any well-being premium of public servants is reduced by between 
0.111 and 0.194. None of the economic factors is significantly related to the reported 
subjective well-being difference. However, in larger states, the subjective well-being 
difference between public administrators and other workers is significantly larger. A 10 % 
increase in population size is related to an increase in the well-being differential of 
approximately 0.015 to 0.023.  
For the individual level control variables, the results qualitatively correspond with the 
findings in Luttmer (2005) for the same dataset.7  
5.2 Robustness 
In the following robustness checks we assess various sources of potential bias. First, we 
include personal income as a regressor in our empirical model. Second, we evaluate the 
sensitivity of our results by excluding individual states from the sample. Third, we discuss 
potential endogeneity issues. Forth, we discuss results based on the first wave with a smaller 
overall sample and a smaller sample of states, pooled estimates including both the first and 
second wave, and finally the second wave but restricted to the smaller sample of states from 
the first wave.  
In our baseline specifications we do not include personal income as a regressor because it may 
be an important channel through which rents are appropriated. If we include log income as an 
additional control variable at the individual level, the results are virtually identical. For the 
specifications II, IV, VI, and VIII including state effects and extended with log income, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms with public administration are -0.807 (std. err.: 0.297) for 
                                                 
7 A detailed regression output for the specifications in Table 2, including the coefficients for all individual level 
control variables, is reported in Table A.2. of the online appendix. 
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transparency, -0.278 (std. err.: 0.123) for elected auditors, 0.024 (std. err.: 0.052) for 
performance audits, -0.437 (std. err.: 0.100) for no-carryover rules, -0.001 (std. err.: 0.020) for 
governor restraints, 0.007 (std. err.: 0.038) for attorney general restraints, -0.037 (std. err.: 
0.034) for legislative restraints, and -0.029 (std. err.: 0.026) for independent commission 
restraints. 
To further assess the sensitivity of our results, we repeat our baseline regressions and exclude 
one state at a time. Table 3 reports the resulting lower and upper bound estimates along with 
the estimates for the full sample from Table 2. Overall, the results are robust to the exclusion 
of individual states. The size of the coefficients for transparency, elected auditors and no-
carryover rules are relatively stable, and all estimates remain significant at conventional 
levels. The estimates for rule-making restraints are rather sensitive to the exclusion of 
individual states: The upper bound estimates exceed lower bound estimates by a factor of 
approximately 4.1 and 6.1 respectively. For the sake of brevity, we omit the estimates from 
dimensions other than legislative restraints and independent commission restraints, which at 
least in some specifications of Table 2 indicate systematic correlations.  
<Table 3 about here>  
Recall that our identification is based exclusively on the interaction effects and is as such an 
application of a differences-in-differences strategy. We do not rely on general well-being 
differences between industries or direct correlations between institutions and reported well-
being, but only on well-being differentials conditional on the institutional setup. Therefore, 
we can control for general unobserved state-specific heterogeneity by including state effects. 
However, one might still worry that some unobserved factor drives both the utility differential 
as well as institutions. One such candidate is political preferences of voters. We try to address 
this concern by including political preference measures (ADA scores) already in the baseline 
regression. Another candidate is the status of the public bureaucracy. If voters perceive the 
bureaucracy as competent and trustworthy, public administrators might be happier and at the 
same time voters might be less inclined to control the bureaucracy. We address this concern 
by controlling for the share of respondents indicating ‘a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ of trust 
and confidence in the state government in a Gallup/ACIR (1992) survey.8 The partial 
correlation between trust and the subjective well-being differential is positive, statistically 
                                                 
8 The survey by Gallup/ACIR (1992) is the only survey with specific questions on trust in state government in 
the relevant period. The question reads: ‘Overall, how much trust and confidence do you have in your state 
government to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities? ‘A great deal’, ‘A fair amount’, ‘Not very 
much’, and ‘None at all’.  
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significant, and ranges from 0.741 (std. err.: 0.317) to 0.978 (std. err.: 0.433). A one standard 
deviation increase in trust amounts to a 0.096 to 0.127 higher well-being differential. This is 
consistent with the view that there is a positive relation between the public’s perception of the 
bureaucracy and potential utility premiums. More importantly, all our previous results are 
robust to the inclusion of this variable and the corresponding interaction term. The estimated 
interaction terms of our institutions with the public administration indicator are -0.742 (std. 
err.: 0.283) for transparency, -0.317 (std. err.: 0.125) for elected auditors, 0.013 (std. err.: 
0.053) for performance audits, -0.450 (std. err.: 0.086) for no-carryover rules, 0.002 (std. err.: 
0.022) for governor restraints, 0.020 (std. err.: 0.042) for attorney general restraints, -0.017 
(std. err.: 0.037) for legislative restraints, and -0.026 (std. err.: 0.022) for independent 
commission restraints.9  
An alternative approach to address endogeneity is to estimate instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions. However, in the context of political institutions it is extremely challenging to find 
valid instruments. Not only has there to be a strong relation between the endogenous covariate 
and the instrument in the first stage, but also the exclusion restriction has to be met. Given 
these difficulties, the literature suggests only an instrument for budget rules. Rueben (1997) 
uses the voter initiative to instrument budget rules. However, voter initiatives may well have a 
direct effect on public employees (e.g., Matsusaka 2009). When we use the availability of 
voter initiatives as an instrument for balanced-budget rules, we do not find a significant 
correlation between no-carryover rules and the voter initiative in the first stage regression. 
Our main results are based on the second wave of the NSFH, i.e., for the years 1992-4. We 
prefer the second to the first wave, because (i) we have observations for all institutional 
variables, (ii) it is the larger cross-section, and (iii) it covers more states. Still, the variables on 
elected auditors, transparency, and no-carryover rules are also available for the years of the 
first wave, 1987-8, with a sample size of 6,152 and 42 states. With this smaller dataset and 
fewer states, previous results cannot be replicated. The estimated effects for the interaction 
terms between public administrators and transparency (coef.: 0.300; std. err.: 0.398), elected 
auditor (coef.: 0.133; std. err.: 0.217) as well as no-carryover rules (coef.: -0.157; std. err.: 
0.199) are not statistically significant. The difference in the results is not due to the different 
coverage of states: Restricting the second wave regressions to the same sample of states of the 
                                                 
9 Note that the survey only covers 39 states and that our results also remain robust to this restriction of the 
sample. The full set of results is reported in Table A.4. of the online appendix. 
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first wave (including state effects) does not materially affect the results.10 The estimated 
coefficients of the relevant interaction terms are as follows: transparency -0.843 (std. err.: 
0.297), elected auditor -0.278 (std. err.: 0.124), performance audits 0.024 (std. err.: 0.052), no-
carryover rule -0.436 (std. err.: 0.098), governor restraints 0.001 (std. err.: 0.020), attorney 
general restraints 0.008 (std. err.: 0.038), legislative restraints -0.035 (std. err.: 0.034), and 
independent commission restraints -0.029 (std. err.: 0.025). We have no convincing 
explanation for the first wave results.  
When pooling both waves, unsurprisingly, our results become weaker. The interaction term of 
no-carryover rules with public administration remains statistically significant (coef.: -0.297, 
std. err.: 0.089), while the interaction effects with transparency (coef.: -0.263, std. err.: 0.189) 
and elected auditors (coef.: -0.097, std. err.: 0.102) fall below conventional levels of statistical 
significance.11  
5.3 Supplementary extensions 
Our main interest is on basic political institutions. They shape longer-term factors that affect 
public administrators as explained in Sections 2.1 to 2.4 and summarized in Hypotheses 1-4. 
Sill, as discussed in Section 2.5, theoretical considerations also suggest current political 
factors such as political competition, last term effects, and unionization to affect the control of 
the public administration.12 These additional hypotheses are tested in a series of regressions 
presented in Table 4, which include measures of political competition, for whether the 
governor faces a binding term limit and is a lame duck, and for public and private sector 
unionization. 
<Table 4 about here> 
The political competition variable stems from Besley et al. (2010) and is based on 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). The variable combines election results of state executive 
offices including governors, lieutenant governors, secretaries of state, attorney generals, 
representatives at the US federal level, etc. The measure captures the average relative vote 
share of Democrats in state-wide electoral races and is constructed as the negative absolute 
difference between the vote share and 0.5. The regression results in column I show a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term between political competition 
and public administrator. One standard deviation stronger political competition is associated 
                                                 
10 See Table A.5. of the online appendix. 
11 See Table A.6. of the online appendix. 
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions. 
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with a 0.081 point lower subjective well-being differential. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that stronger political competition leads to stronger incentives to control public 
administrators.  
The incentives of the executive, which is the direct principal of the bureaucracy, might also 
affect rent creation in the public administration. The literature in political economy has shown 
that executives who face a binding term limit (i.e. lame ducks) implement different policies 
than executives with intact electoral incentives (e.g. Besley and Case 1995; List and Sturm 
2006). Besides these last term effects, it is important to also control for the general effect of 
term limits, because the existence of term limits can have independent effects on policy 
outcomes (Schelker 2011). In column 2, the estimated interaction terms between public 
administrators and lame duck governors or term limits respectively are not statistically 
significant. However, the direction of the effects accords with prior expectations. 
Finally, we estimate the influence of unionization on subjective well-being differentials. We 
include both public and private sector unionization because our estimation strategy builds on 
both sectors. We use the union density measures by Hirsch et al. (2001) who estimate sector-
specific shares of union membership and union coverage. Column 3 reports regression results 
relying on union membership, but the estimates are qualitatively equivalent when using union 
coverage instead. The estimated effects show that both relevant interaction terms are not 
statistically significant. The direction of the effects, however, would be consistent with the 
notion that unhappy bureaucrats are more likely to join unions.  
6. Conclusions 
Voters and elected officials delegate legislative and executive authority to bureaucratic 
agencies. This allows public servants to carry out their responsibilities. However, it also offers 
them an opportunity to exploit their monopolistic position and informational advantage to 
extract rents. Institutional reforms that strengthen accountability and reduce the discretionary 
leeway in the public administration can alleviate this well-known problem. Such reforms have 
gained a new urgency as cash-strapped governments in US states and around the world are 
forced to cut back spending. Adequate institutional reforms may provide a way of reducing 
spending without the need to reduce services by the same amount. 
Our analysis sheds light on the promise of such reforms. The empirical results for the early 
1990s suggest that transparency requirements, public auditors, and balanced-budget 
provisions are effective means for reducing bureaucratic rents. However, given our (partial) 
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failure to replicate the results for earlier years, it seems to be important to repeat the analysis 
for other countries and periods for which data is available. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available online at the OUP website. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the main variables  
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Subjective well-being 5.41 1.21 1.00 7.00 
Public administration 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Transparency 0.46 0.18 0.11 0.89 
Elected auditor 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Performance audits 1.92 1.15 0.00 3.00 
No-carryover rules 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Balanced-budget index 7.54 2.53 0.00 10.00 
Governor restraints 3.43 2.60 1.00 8.00 
Attorney general restraints 1.78 1.93 0.00 8.00 
Legislative restraints 3.40 2.05 0.00 8.00 
Ind. commission restraints 1.75 2.94 0.00 8.00 
Ln(state income) 9.56 0.12 9.26 9.84 
Ln(population) 15.74 0.88 13.05 17.26 
Unemployment rate 6.64 1.38 2.60 10.80 
ADA scores 46.93 13.42 5.43 87.57 
Trust in state government 0.52 0.13 0.15 0.86 
Political competition -0.05 0.05 -0.23 -9.5e-4 
Lame duck governor 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Term limits 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Public sector union density 36.73 17.92 8.30 72.60 
Private sector union density 11.05 4.87 2.40 19.60 
Notes: Summary statistics for sample in baseline regressions. N = 7,444. Summary statistics for the 
other individual level variables are reported in the online appendix. 
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Table 2. Institutions and public-private sector subjective well-being differentials 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Private sector Reference group 
Public administration -0.036 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.050 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.060 
 
 
(0.057)
 
(0.055)
 
(0.055)
 
(0.054)
 
(0.049)
 
(0.048)
 
(0.060)
 
(0.058)
 
(0.039)
 
(0.038)
 Public admin. x transparency -0.845** -0.818** 
      
-0.058
 
-0.080
 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.295) 
       
(0.372)
 
(0.365)
 Public admin. x elected auditor 
  
-0.263* -0.276* 
    
-0.236* -0.249* 
   
(0.123) 
 
(0.124) 
     
(0.099) 
 
(0.098) 
 Public admin. x performance audits 
  
0.028
 
0.025
     
0.038
 
0.025
 
   
(0.053)
 
(0.052)
     
(0.051)
 
(0.051)
 Public admin. x no-carryover rules 
    
-0.441** -0.443** 
  
-0.410** -0.397** 
     
(0.103) 
 
(0.098) 
   
(0.102) 
 
(0.099) 
 Public admin. x governor restraints 
      
-0.002
 
-0.001
 
-0.005
 
-0.003
 
       
(0.021)
 
(0.020)
 
(0.017)
 
(0.016)
 Public admin. x attorney general restr. 
      
0.016
 
0.007
 
0.030
 
0.017
 
       
(0.037)
 
(0.038)
 
(0.027)
 
(0.028)
 Public admin. x legislative restraints 
      
-0.036
 
-0.035
 
-0.045
 
-0.045(*) 
       
(0.034)
 
(0.033)
 
(0.028)
 
(0.026) 
 Public admin. x ind. commission restr. 
      
-0.030
 
-0.029
 
-0.035(*) -0.034(*) 
       
(0.026)
 
(0.025)
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 Transparency 0.028
 
-0.315
       
0.046
 
-0.325
 
 
(0.074)
 
(0.735)
       
(0.079)
 
(0.707)
 Elected auditor 
  
0.017
 
-
     
0.017
 
-
 
   
(0.028)
      
(0.026)
  Performance audits 
  
-0.024* -
     
-0.031* -
 
   
(0.011) 
      
(0.013) 
  No-carryover rules 
    
0.015
 
-
   
0.001
 
-
 
     
(0.033)
    
(0.031)
  Governor restraints 
      
-0.004
 
-
 
-0.006
 
-
 
       
(0.004)
  
(0.004)
  Attorney general restraints 
      
-0.006
 
-
 
-0.012
 
-
 
       
(0.006)
  
(0.008)
  Legislative restraints 
      
-0.009
 
-
 
-0.009
 
-
 
       
(0.005)
  
(0.006)
  Ind. commission restraints 
      
-0.004
 
-
 
-0.004
 
-
 
         
(0.004)
  
(0.004)
   To be continued. 
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Table 2, part 2. 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Public admin. x ln(state income) 0.800 
 
0.546 
 
0.020 
 
-0.191 
 
-0.154 
 
-0.378 
 
0.303 
 
0.058 
 
-0.333 
 
-0.497 
 
 
(0.639)
 
(0.634)
 
(0.727)
 
(0.742)
 
(0.515)
 
(0.516)
 
(0.782)
 
(0.795)
 
(0.537)
 
(0.527)
 Public admin. x ln(population) 0.169* 0.198* 0.217* 0.242* 0.159* 0.185** 0.213(*) 0.239* 0.163* 0.188* 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.070) 
 Public admin. x unemployment rate 0.021
 
0.009
 
-0.022
 
-0.034
 
-0.003
 
-0.014
 
-0.007
 
-0.024
 
-0.013
 
-0.030
 
 
(0.039)
 
(0.041)
 
(0.041)
 
(0.041)
 
(0.033)
 
(0.032)
 
(0.052)
 
(0.054)
 
(0.036)
 
(0.037)
 Public admin. x ADA scores -0.016** -0.014** -0.009(*) -0.008(*) -0.014** -0.013** -0.009(*) -0.008
 
-0.010(*) -0.009(*) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005)
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 Ln(state income) -0.346(*) 1.486
 
-0.288
 
1.409
 
-0.316
 
1.411
 
-0.299
 
1.389
 
-0.221
 
1.586
 
 
(0.190) 
 
(1.804)
 
(0.190)
 
(1.765)
 
(0.221)
 
(1.768)
 
(0.199)
 
(1.783)
 
(0.166)
 
(1.796)
 Ln(population) -0.015
 
5.103(*) -0.007
 
5.012(*) -0.016
 
5.137(*) -0.024
 
5.019(*) -0.017
 
5.179(*) 
 
(0.022)
 
(2.578) 
 
(0.022)
 
(2.676) 
 
(0.022)
 
(2.714) 
 
(0.022)
 
(2.703) 
 
(0.019)
 
(2.593) 
 Unemployment rate -0.013
 
0.016
 
-0.013
 
0.019
 
-0.012
 
0.019
 
-0.017
 
0.017
 
-0.019
 
0.021
 
 
(0.013)
 
(0.040)
 
(0.014)
 
(0.041)
 
(0.014)
 
(0.040)
 
(0.014)
 
(0.041)
 
(0.015)
 
(0.039)
 ADA scores 0.002
 
-0.002
 
0.002
 
-0.002
 
0.002
 
-0.001
 
0.002
 
-0.002
 
0.002
 
-0.002
 
 
(0.001)
 
(0.006)
 
(0.001)
 
(0.006)
 
(0.001)
 
(0.006)
 
(0.001)
 
(0.006)
 
(0.001)
 
(0.006)
 Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 5.409 ** 5.409 ** 5.408 ** 5.409 ** 5.409 ** 5.409 ** 5.408 ** 5.409 ** 5.408 ** 5.409 ** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.002) 
 Number of observations 7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 
7444
 Number of clusters 49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 
49
 R squared/Adj. R squared 0.038
 
0.035
 
0.038
 
0.035
 
0.039
 
0.036
 
0.038
 
0.034
 
0.041
 
0.036
 Notes: (1) OLS estimations; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on state level; (3) ** is significant at the 99 % level; * at the 95 % level, 
and (*) at the 90 % level. 
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Table 3. Robustness test: Exclusion of individual states 
Interaction term Coef. 
 
Rob. SE 
  Public administration x transparency -0.818 ** 0.295 
 
 
-0.674 * 0.309 lower bound 
 
-1.000 ** 0.275 upper bound 
 Public administration x elected auditor -0.276 * 0.124 
 
 
-0.219 (*) 0.116 lower bound 
 
-0.370 * 0.145 upper bound 
 Public administration x no-carryover rules -0.443 ** 0.098 
 
 
-0.385 ** 0.091 lower bound 
 
-0.488 ** 0.094 upper bound 
 Public administration x legislative restraints -0.035 
 
0.033 
 
 
-0.013 
 
0.032 lower bound 
 
-0.053 
 
0.034 upper bound 
 Public administration x ind. commission -0.029 
 
0.025 
  restraints -0.009 
 
0.025 lower bound 
 
-0.055 * 0.027 upper bound 
Notes: (1) This table reports the smallest and the largest coefficients from repeated regressions with one 
state excluded at a time; for comparative purposes, the coefficients of the regressions for the whole 
sample are also shown; the regressions contain the same set of variables as the regressions in even 
columns of Table 2; (2) OLS estimations including state effects; (3) robust standard errors in parentheses 
adjusted for clustering on state level; (4) ** is significant at the 99 % level; * at the 95 % level, and (*) at 
the 90 % level. 
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Table 4. Extensions: Current political process and the subjective well-being differential of the public administration 
 
I II III 
 
Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE 
Private sector Reference group 
Public administration -0.041 
 
0.055 -0.044 
 
0.056 -0.053 
 
0.054 
Public administration x political competition -1.582 * 0.684 
    Public administration x lame duck governor 
  
0.071 
 
0.163 
  Public administration x term limits governor 
  
-0.197 
 
0.142 
  Public administration x public sector union density 
    
-0.006 
 
0.005 
Public administration x private sector union density 
    
-0.010 
 
0.017 
Political competition -0.342 
 
0.387 
    Lame duck governor 
  
-0.137 * 0.058 
  Term limits governor 
  
0.023 
 
0.090 
  Public sector union density 
    
-0.013 
 
0.013 
Private sector union density 
    
0.018 
 
0.035 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
State controls Yes Yes Yes 
State effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.399 ** 0.006 5.409 ** 0.003 5.409 ** 0.003 
Number of observations  7438  7444  7444 
Number of clusters  47  49  49 
Adj. R squared  0.034  0.034  0.035 
Notes: (1) OLS estimations; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering on state level; (3) ** is significant at the 99 % level; * at the 
95 % level, and (*) at the 90 % level. 
 
